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Imprisonment Inertia and Public Attitudes Toward 
“Truth in Sentencing” 
Michael O’Hear* 
Darren Wheelock** 
Despite more than a decade of effort by policymakers across the 
United States, America’s imprisonment rate seems stuck at 
historically high levels. The nation’s prison population exploded 
between 1972 and 2001, with the number of prisoners increasing 
sevenfold from 196,092 to more than 1.4 million—averaging a 
400,000-prisoner jump each decade.1 However, all of the associated 
prison-building and staffing put an enormous strain on many state 
budgets, with the total costs of incarceration increasing from $5 
billion in 1978 to $40 billion in 2000.2 The 2001 recession, in 
particular, served as a wakeup call for many policymakers, convincing 
them that imprisonment rates had reached unsustainable 
levels.3There followed a widespread flowering of state initiatives to 
divert more offenders from incarceration and to move out those who 
were already in prison more quickly.4 Despite these realizations, a 
sort of inertia set in. Imprisonment numbers did not come down, 
but actually grew by about another 200,000 in the decade following 
2001.5 To be sure, this represented a marked deceleration from the 
prior rate of growth, but the failure of so many reform efforts to 
 
* Professor, Marquette University Law School. B.A., J.D. Yale University. We are grateful to 
Olga Semukhina, Ryan Scoville, and Michael Tonry for comments on an earlier draft, and to 
Charles Franklin for collaborating on the survey research reported here. 
** Associate Professor, Marquette University Department of Social and Cultural Sciences. 
B.A., Ph.D. University of Minnesota. 
 1. Compare PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–1986, 
NCJ I11098, 15 (1988) (1972 data), with E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, NCJ 239808, 2 (2012). 
 2. Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing Correctional Costs in an Era of 
Tightening Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. SENT. REP. 332, 332 (2002). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 333–35; Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of 
Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011). 
 5. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 1, at 2.  
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accomplish real reductions in imprisonment has been both 
disappointing and puzzling—all the more so in light of a remarkably 
large and sustained drop in American crime rates that began in the 
early 1990s.6 
In truth, despite budgetary pressures and relatively low crime 
rates, policymakers in many states have been quite cautious in the 
design and administration of new programs intended to move 
prisoners out of confinement more quickly.7 In order to better 
understand the sources of this caution, as well as the potential for 
developing more robust early-release initiatives, we set out to study 
public opinion regarding sentencing and corrections in the state of 
Wisconsin, which had a prominent failed experiment with early-
release reforms between 2009 and 2011.8 Our research is based on 
public opinion surveys of hundreds of Wisconsin voters in 2012, 
2013, and 2014. Their responses reflect the same conflicting beliefs 
about early release that are also revealed in the troubled history of 
the on-again off-again 2009 reforms. 
More specifically, public opinion embraces two policy preferences 
that are in tension with one another. On the one hand, we find 
strong support for the ideal of “truth in sentencing,” or TIS—that 
is, the ideal that an offender must serve the full term of 
imprisonment imposed at sentencing.9 On the other hand, we also 
find strong support for moving prisoners into less costly forms of 
punishment when it is safe to do so.10 Neither of these competing 
policy preferences can be fully implemented without detriment to 
the other. 
Although our research identifies a dilemma for policymakers 
seeking to satisfy public opinion, it also suggests a path forward. 
First, our questions elicited not merely general attitudes, but also 
views about specific procedural and institutional aspects of early-
release programs. The results allow us to make conclusions about 
what type of early-release programs would garner the greatest levels 
of public support. For instance, we find much greater support for an 
 
 6. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE V (2007). 
 7. Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 416–
17 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Id.at 417, 435–39 (including Wisconsin as one of six profiles of state 
experiences with early-release reforms). 
 9. Infra Part III. 
 10. Infra Part IV. 
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early-release program administered by an expert commission than by 
trial court judges. Second, our results point to a distinctive 
population of swing voters who are drawn both to TIS and early 
release. A majority of our respondents did not display any 
ambivalence toward TIS and early release, but clearly favored one or 
the other. Approximately thirty percent of voters in the middle 
favored both positions, and thereby caused the overall poll results to 
appear inconsistent. A careful assessment of the survey responses 
provides insight into how reformers can most effectively appeal to 
this politically crucial group. 
Our research offers a unique contribution to the scholarly 
literature in several respects. First, we provide the first systematic 
assessment of public attitudes toward TIS. Although TIS became a 
nationally important phenomenon in the 1990s, with forty-two 
states adopting TIS laws by the decade’s end,11 scholars have paid 
little attention to the extent and sources of public support for the 
laws, often assuming that they are simply an expression of general 
punitiveness12—an assumption that we show to be incorrect.13 
Second, we explore public attitudes toward several specific aspects of 
early-release reforms that have not previously been studied in any 
published research. Finally, we identify and describe, for the first time 
in the scholarly literature, the early-release swing voters, showing 
how they are differentiated from other components of the electorate. 
Our analysis is based exclusively on the views of Wisconsin 
voters. Nonetheless, we believe that public opinion in the Badger 
State should be of much wider national interest. Indeed, there are 
reasons to think that these Wisconsin survey data might be reflective 
of broader national views toward crime and punishment. For 
instance, among the fifty states, Wisconsin’s imprisonment rate 
stands not far from the nation’s middle with its ranking as the thirty-
third highest imprisonment rate.14 Moreover, a recent series of 
 
 11. WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-
SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON 
POPULATIONS 7 (2002). 
 12. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 142 (2001) (discussing 
TIS laws as an indicator of popular punitiveness); Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 
1975–2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 173 (2013) (grouping TIS laws together with mandatory 
minimum, three-strikes, and life without the possibility of parole laws as expressions of “tough 
on crime” values). 
 13. Infra Part III. 
 14. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 1, at 23. 
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closely fought, nationally prominent electoral campaigns underscores 
Wisconsin’s position as a genuinely “purple” state that sits 
somewhere close to the nation’s political center of gravity.15 Thus, 
Wisconsin’s divisions in the highly politicized field of criminal justice 
are not likely much different from what one might find in the nation 
as a whole. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss Wisconsin’s 
TIS law, including the short-lived reforms of 2009 through 2011, 
and highlight competing understandings of the reasons for the law. 
In Part II, we describe the survey methodology and our analytical 
strategy. In Part III, we delve into the sources that support TIS. In 
Part IV, we identify specific early-release reform ideas that have 
majority support and suggest what a credible reform proposal might 
include. In Part V, we describe swing-voter values and preferences 
and suggest how a reform proposal might be framed to better appeal 
to those voters. Finally, in Part VI we recapitulate our key findings 
and revisit the narrative of Part I in light of the survey results. 
I. BACKGROUND: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN WISCONSIN 
Wisconsin adopted truth in sentencing in 1998 through a statute 
now often referred to as “TIS I.” The state later modified its TIS 
regime in 2002 (TIS II), 2009 (TIS III), and 2011 (TIS IV). In this 
Part, we discuss each reform in turn. Through this discussion, we 
will highlight the values and policy considerations that have 
dominated the political rhetoric surrounding TIS and early release in 
 
 15. Wisconsin was among the nation’s most hotly contested states in both the 2000 and 
2004 presidential elections. In 2000, Democrat Al Gore defeated Republican George W. Bush 
by fewer than 6,000 votes out of more than 2.5 million cast. WIS. LEG. REF. BUREAU, 
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2001–2002 936 (2001). In 2004, Democrat John F. Kerry edged 
out Bush by only 11,000 votes out of nearly three million cast. WIS. LEG. REF. BUREAU, 
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2005–2006 936 (2005). Although Barack Obama won more 
convincing victories in 2008 and 2012, neither Republican Senator Ron Johnson in 2010 nor 
Democratic Senator Tammy Baldwin in 2012 managed to win even fifty-two percent of the 
vote. WIS. LEG. REF. BUREAU, WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2013–2014 880 (2013); WIS. LEG. 
REF. BUREAU, WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2011–2012 882 (2011). In gubernatorial politics, 
Republican Scott Walker defeated Democrat Tom Barrett by about 125,000 votes out of more 
than two million cast in 2010, and then again by about 170,000 out of nearly 2.5 million in a 
nationally prominent recall election in 2012. WIS. LEG. REF. BUREAU, WISCONSIN BLUE 
BOOK 2013–2014 912 (2013); WIS. LEG. REF. BUREAU, WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2011–2012 
912 (2011). Of course, the facts that Republican Walker and Democrat Obama both won in 
2012, and that both Republican Johnson and Democrat Baldwin represent Wisconsin in the 
U.S. Senate, demonstrate the closely divided character of the state’s politics. 
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Wisconsin. This Part thus establishes a conceptual framework for 
assessing reforms in this area. This framework structures the polling 
research and analysis that are the subject of the rest of the Article. 
A. Wisconsin’s Path  to Truth in Sentencing 
1. Long-term crime and imprisonment trends 
The adoption of TIS I and its subsequent modifications cannot 
be understood without reference to long-term crime and 
imprisonment trends. Although the focus is on Wisconsin, the state’s 
trajectory generally mirrors that of the nation as a whole. Violent 
crime grew markedly from the early 1960s until the mid-1990s. As 
indicated in Figure 1, the 1995 peak was nearly ten times higher 
than the 1963 valley. Since 1995, violent crime has been up and 
down, but still remains far above the 1960s and 1970s levels. 
Figure 1. Wisconsin violent crime per 100,000 residents, 
1960–201016 
 
 
 16. “Violent crime” refers here to the four violent “index” crimes tracked by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation: homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. The data come from 
the FBI’s annual reports Crime in the United States, which are available back to 1995 at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. Older reports are available online from LLMC 
Digital at http://www.llmcdigital.org/titleresults.aspx?searchtype=0&set=80524&volume=&p
art=&page.  
OHEAR WHEELOCK.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
262 
0
100
200
300
400
500
Imprisonment went through its own, equally sustained surge. As 
indicated in Figure 2, Wisconsin’s imprisonment rate grew every 
single year from 1972 through 2003, and then hit an all-time high in 
2006, reaching a level more than nine times that of the early 1970s. 
Such explosive growth pushed Wisconsin’s prison system into a 
position of chronic overcrowding, even notwithstanding an 
extraordinary prison-building boom.17 Meanwhile, the state 
corrections budget more than quintupled between 1984 and 2000.18 
Figure 2. Wisconsin imprisonment per 100,000, 1972–201119 
 
Fortunately for the Department of Corrections (“DOC”), a 
variety of safety valves were available to prevent a complete system 
meltdown. In the 1990s, the most important safeguard was 
 
 17. In 1974, Wisconsin’s prison population was below the state’s total designed bed 
capacity, but by 1982 the population had grown to 120% of capacity. See WIS. DIV. OF CORR., 
FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY REPORT OF POPULATION MOVEMENT (1974); WIS. LEGISLATIVE 
FISCAL BUREAU, ADULT AND JUVENILE CORRECTIONS PROGRAM Attachment II (1983). Beds 
increased by more than fifty percent in the next decade, but the system only fell further 
behind; by 1992, the prison population was nearly 130% of capacity. WIS. DEPT. OF CORR., 
FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY REPORT OF POPULATION MOVEMENT (1992). 
 18. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—2003 13 (2003). 
 19. “Imprisonment” here refers only to those incarcerated persons sentenced to prison, 
and does not include those incarcerated in local jails. Older data come from PATRICK A. 
LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE 
AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–1986 (1988). More recent data come from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics’ annual Prisoners reports, which are available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=40. 
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discretionary parole. Under Wisconsin’s pre-TIS system, the term of 
imprisonment imposed on an offender at sentencing merely 
established parameters within which the Parole Commission would 
work to determine the actual release date. In general, the 
Commission had discretion to permit release after only twenty-five 
percent of the sentence had been served, and release was required by 
the time two-thirds of the sentence was complete.20 The absence of 
objective criteria meant that the Commission, which was located 
organizationally within the DOC,21 had considerable freedom to 
liberalize release in times of prison overcrowding.22 And, sure 
enough, as prison admissions exploded in the 1990s, the parole 
safety valve was soon opened wide.23 As a result of this liberalization, 
the average prison time served before release dropped by seven 
percent between 1990 and 1998, even though the average prison 
sentence increased by eight percent in the same time period.24 This 
widening gap between nominal and actual sentence lengths served as 
an impetus for the adoption of TIS in 1998. 
2. The politics of TIS I 
Abolishing parole was not a new idea in Wisconsin in 1998. 
“Determinate sentencing,” an earlier term for TIS, had been 
adopted by several states in the 1970s and debated extensively in 
Wisconsin during that time period.25 However, legislative reform 
 
 20. JOE FONTAINE, WIS. SENT’ING COMM’N, SENTENCING POLICY IN WISCONSIN: 
1975–2005 (2005). 
 21. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, ADULT CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 
24 (1995). 
 22. Patrick J. Fiedler, The Wisconsin Department of Corrections: An Expensive 
Proposition, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 501, 513–15 (1993). 
 23. For instance, in 1990, more than forty percent of the males released from prison in 
Wisconsin were required to wait until their mandatory release date, but in 1991 that figure 
dropped to less than thirty percent, and in 1992, to less than fifteen percent. WIS. LEG. FISCAL 
BUREAU, INFORMATION PAPER #53: ADULT CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 6 (1993). Mandatory 
releases eventually dropped below ten percent in 1994 and remained low through the mid-
1990s.WIS. LEG. FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATION PAPER #54: ADULT CORRECTIONS 
PROGRAM 11 (1997). 
 24. Mike Flaherty, Truth in Sentencing: End of Parole Could Jam Prisons, Boost Budget, 
WIS. ST. J., April 12, 1998, at 1A, available at 1998 WLNR 5462617. 
 25. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 6–9. 
OHEAR WHEELOCK.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
264 
proposals proved unsuccessful,26 and interest in determinate 
sentencing waned in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Republican Governor Tommy Thompson revived the attack on 
parole in his 1994 reelection campaign.27 However, Thompson also 
understood the prison population pressures facing the state and the 
importance of parole’s safety valve function, which may explain why 
he did not move swiftly to deliver on his TIS campaign promise. 
Perhaps sensing the difficulty of Thompson’s position, Democrat 
Attorney General Jim Doyle decided to press the attack on parole, 
releasing a specific reform proposal in October 1996.28 Doyle’s 
proposal followed the lead of most TIS jurisdictions in retaining an 
opportunity for inmates to earn an earlier release date through good 
behavior in prison; as in the federal system, the good-behavior 
credits could amount to at most fifteen percent of the sentence.29 
The proposal also called for the creation of a commission to develop 
plans for implementing TIS.30 
What followed was a classic bit of tough-on-crime one-
upmanship. Letting prisoners out after serving just eighty-five 
percent of their sentences, sniffed Thompson’s spokesman, is not 
truth in sentencing.31 Consistent with this rebuff, Thompson 
proposed his own version of TIS in January 1997.32 The governor’s 
bill served notice that he would not permit Democrats to out-tough 
him on crime issues. Not only did the bill eliminate good-time 
credit, thereby requiring inmates to serve one hundred percent of 
their sentences, but it also increased maximum sentences for nearly 
all felonies by fifty percent or more in order to provide more time for 
a period of community supervision at the end of the prison term.33 
 
 26. See WIS. LEG. COUNCIL STAFF, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 84-4: THE FELONY 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES LAW 5–6 (1984) (discussing 1979 Assembly Bill 1190). 
 27. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 24. 
 28. Id. at 25. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Doyle Urges Halt to Earlier Releases; Report Shows Felons Are Serving Shorter 
Sentences Than Six Years Ago, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996. 
 32. David Callender, Trial Judges Endorse “Truth in Sentencing,” CAPITAL TIMES, May 
9, 1997, at 1A. 
 33. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 25; Matt Pommer, Gov Signs Truth in Sentencing Bill, 
CAPITAL TIMES, June 15, 1998, at 1A. 
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Doyle and Thompson eventually negotiated a compromise bill in 
June 1997,34 which the legislature enacted by large majorities a year 
later.35 Key provisions included Thompson’s “100 percent truth” 
(i.e., no good-time credits), across-the-board increase in maximum 
sentences, and an implementation committee to figure out how to 
make the system work. The new regime would govern all felonies 
committed on or after December 31, 1999.36 
3. Making sense of TIS I 
A review of the history leading to TIS I’s adoption suggests at 
least three different interpretations of the law’s overarching purpose: 
instrumental, legitimacy-enhancing, or symbolic. First, TIS I may be 
understood in instrumental terms as a measure intended to reduce 
crime by increasing the severity of actual prison terms in Wisconsin. 
As indicated in Figure 1, violent crime hit a peak in 1995, the year 
before Doyle advanced his TIS proposal, and remained very high 
relative to historical norms throughout the entire time period that 
TIS was debated. As crime rates headed toward their 1995 peak, 
parole simultaneously grew more generous.37 It is understandable 
that observers might have associated these two trends causally and 
viewed the elimination of parole as a public-safety measure. 
However, it is important to realize that TIS I did not necessarily 
increase penal severity. In theory, sentencing judges might have 
taken into account the elimination of parole and handed out more 
lenient sentences. For instance, if burglars were generally expected to 
be paroled halfway through their prison terms, a pre-TIS judge 
might have given ten years to burglars in the belief that five years in 
prison was the right punishment for the crime. After TIS I took 
effect, the same judge could achieve the same “right punishment” by 
imposing five-year terms on burglars. If all judges took this approach 
with all crimes, then TIS I would have no effect on severity. Strictly 
speaking, nothing in TIS I precluded this possibility—the law 
imposed no mandatory minimum sentences. 
If TIS I were not intended to protect public safety by increasing 
real sentence lengths, then what else might be the law’s purpose? In 
 
 34. FONTAINE, supra, note 20, at 26. 
 35. Id. 
 36. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(1) (2011–12). 
 37. Supra Part I.A.1. 
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lieu of the instrumental rationale, many TIS supporters actually 
tended to emphasize more prominently what we would call a 
legitimacy rationale, which was captured in the oft-repeated claim that 
TIS would “restor[e] faith in Wisconsin’s criminal justice system.”38 
On the legitimacy rationale, the problem was not that prison 
stays were too short per se, but that the wrong people were making 
the decisions in a procedurally unacceptable manner. For instance, 
Doyle made the point this way: 
The current system has removed power [from the] elected judges of 
our state and placed it in the hands of the corrections bureaucracy. 
After all the facts in a case, we expect judges to issue fair sentences. 
Those sentences should not be overturned by corrections 
department employees who are looking for a few more beds. 
We elect judges to make sentencing decisions. They should be held 
accountable for their actions. If the public doesn’t like the job they 
do, new judges should be elected. It is difficult to make mid-level 
corrections officials accountable in the same way.39 
Similarly, Thompson declared, “elected judges, not unelected 
parole boards” should decide how much time criminals will serve 
behind bars.40 
Along with democratic accountability, transparency also figured 
into the legitimacy critique. Doyle charged that, with parole lurking 
in the background, sentencing hearings had become “largely 
charades.”41 Likewise, a leading supporter in the senate argued, 
“[o]ur current system of penalizing and imprisoning people is a 
fraud perpetrated on the victims. . . . We’ve probably all heard . . . 
the stories from district attorneys that tell us that there’s no way they 
can tell a victim how long somebody will be behind bars.”42 
Such legitimacy arguments were important, in part, because of 
the great uncertainty over what sentencing judges would do in the 
 
 38. “Truth” . . . Or Consequences, WIS. ST. J., June 12, 1997, at 11A (editorial 
endorsing TIS). 
 39. James E. Doyle, Wisconsin Needs “Truth in Sentencing,” 20 WIS. BAR CRIM. L. 
NEWS, Jan. 1997, at 17, 18. 
 40. Mike Flaherty, One of State’s Costliest Programs? Warning Issued as Senate OKs 
Sentencing Bill, WIS. ST. J., May 2, 1998, at 1A. 
 41. Matt Pommer, Doyle Pushes Sentencing Bill, Says Hearings Now “Charades,” 
CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, at 4A.  
 42. Richard P. Jones, Senate Easily Passes Bill to End Parole; It Would Take Effect in ‘99, 
MILWAUKEE. J. SENTINEL, May 2, 1998, at 1 (quoting Senator Joanne Huelsman). 
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new TIS regime, which rendered quite speculative any claims, pro or 
con, about the more tangible effects of the reform proposal. For 
instance, in response to arguments that TIS would cause a fiscally 
catastrophic increase in the prison population, Representative Scott 
Walker, the Assembly’s leading TIS proponent, emphasized the 
transparency benefits and instrumental uncertainties: “While it’s still 
very debatable whether truth in sentencing will require any 
additional money, how can you put a price tag on peace of mind for 
victims and their families? It’s invaluable.”43 
Yet, while sometimes suggesting that overall severity (and hence 
cost) might not increase much under TIS, proponents argued at 
other times that eliminating parole would bring instrumental crime-
reducing benefits. Doyle, for instance, asserted, “[t]oo many people, 
who are released from prison, commit new violent crimes while on 
parole,” and claimed that “[t]ruth in sentencing also creates 
deterrence.”44 Thompson also invoked incapacitation and deterrence 
themes, even going so far at one point as to quantify the crime-
reduction benefits of TIS as being worth nearly $400 million 
annually.45 Moreover, any claimed expectation that TIS I would be 
severity-neutral seemed belied by the law’s across-the-board fifty-
percent increase in maximum sentence lengths.46 
In short, the record provides substantial support for the 
importance of both the instrumental and the legitimacy rationales of 
TIS I. Of course, these different types of justification for the law are 
not mutually exclusive, and both likely played a role in building 
public and political support for the reform. Still, while the 
instrumental and legitimacy arguments dominated the public debate 
over TIS I, there is at least one additional way of understanding the 
law’s adoption that merits consideration. 
 
 43. Matt Pommer, Huge Savings Claimed for “Truth in Sentencing,” but Prison Expert 
Dickey Calls Numbers “Fiction,” CAPITAL TIMES, June 4, 1997, at 4A. 
 44. Doyle, supra note 39, at 18. 
 45. Mike Flaherty, “Truth in Sentencing” Measure Gets Cost-Effective Designation; A 
Study From the Governor Says Money Would Be Saved Over Time in Crime Prevention, WIS. ST. 
J., June 4, 1997, at 5C; see also Flaherty, supra note 40 (“When Gov. Tommy Thompson 
proposed [TIS] last year, he also said criminals ‘no longer fear Wisconsin’s prison system’ 
because they know they won’t serve their full sentence in prison.’”). 
 46. Richard P. Jones, Senate Panel Urges Truth-in-Sentencing Approval; Party-Line Vote 
Also Recommends Passage of “Cocaine-Mom” Legislation, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, April 30, 
1998, at 3B. 
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Research suggests that public support for punitive laws may rest 
primarily on symbolic considerations. Tom Tyler and Robert 
Boeckmann describe the dynamics this way: 
[This] model is concerned with the moral meaning of rule-
breaking behavior. This model suggests that rule breaking is an 
affront to social and moral values and norms, while punishment 
reasserts community commitment to those values. This approach 
focuses on the “symbolic” meaning of rule breaking. It links 
reactions to rule breaking to concerns about social conditions and 
to judgments about cohesiveness, that is, to public concerns about 
the nature and strength of social bonds within the family, the 
community, and society. In other words, it suggests that people 
want to punish rule breakers because rule-breaking behavior poses 
a threat to the moral cohesion of society and because punishment 
reasserts social values and the obligation to obey social rules.47 
The symbolic understanding of TIS I seems implicit in Governor 
Thompson’s statement on signing the law that it was “not a good day 
for the bad guys in Wisconsin.”48 Symbolic considerations may also 
help to explain why a “truth in sentencing” law was adopted in 1998 
when a “determinate sentencing” law was rejected in 1980: a law 
bearing the “truth” label more readily tapped into public anxieties 
about trust and the need to reassert traditional moral values. 
Again, symbolic interpretations of TIS I do not exclude the 
instrumental and legitimacy interpretations; the abolition of parole in 
Wisconsin likely resulted from a diverse set of considerations. 
However, developing a clearer sense of which considerations are 
most important in maintaining support for TIS may provide insight 
into how future reform proposals might be most effectively designed 
and framed. For instance, if instrumental considerations play a 
 
 47. Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why? The 
Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237, 240 
(1997). This symbolic view of punishment resonates with modern “communicative” theories 
of retribution. Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate 
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1254 (2011). In this context, however, we prefer the 
term “symbolic” over “retributive” both to relate our research to Tyler and Boeckmann’s 
important work and because retributivism sometimes has quite different connotations, such as 
simple vengeance or “an eye for an eye.” Id. We also think the term “symbolic” more clearly 
indicates the basic contrast we wish to draw with “instrumental” approaches to punishment. 
Whereas instrumentally motivated policies seek to achieve some concrete change in the world, 
symbolically motivated policies are adopted because the adoption in and of itself communicates 
approval of certain appealing social values. 
 48. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 34. 
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relatively minor role, then reformers may make little headway with 
voters by arguing solely that TIS could be relaxed in one way or 
another without compromising public safety; reformers would also 
have to speak convincingly to legitimacy and/or symbolic concerns. 
We try to untangle the relative importance of these various 
considerations in Part III below. 
B. TIS II: Reintroducing Early Release 
If, based on the political rhetoric, there was some doubt about 
the primary purpose of TIS I, no such doubt exists as to TIS II. 
Adopted in 2002, TIS II was clearly framed in the media and in the 
legislative process as an effort to blunt the adverse budgetary 
consequences of TIS I. In this sense, TIS II was instrumental in its 
orientation, albeit not with the same crime-reduction ends in view as 
TIS I; the later statute aimed instead at achieving reductions in the 
rate of growth of Wisconsin’s prison population. 
TIS II grew out of the work of the implementation committee 
authorized by TIS I, which was supposed to make recommendations 
for statutory reforms to the legislature. Although TIS I did not 
specifically instruct the Criminal Penalties Study Committee to focus 
on cost concerns, Governor Thompson urged the committee to try 
to do something about the rising corrections budget when he 
appointed the committee’s chair, Judge Thomas Barland.49 Indeed, 
Barland later recalled that this objective “dominated our thoughts 
and discussion” in the committee.50 The committee’s proposal thus 
had the effect of reducing severity (and hence corrections costs) in 
several respects, including new limits on the period of initial 
confinement to prison.51 
To this package, the Democrat-controlled senate added another 
severity-reducing measure: a sentence-modification provision that 
would permit judges to revisit, and potentially reduce, sentences 
after just twenty-five percent of the prison term had been served.52 
Although the Republican-controlled assembly had quickly passed the 
committee recommendations,53 Representative Walker and his 
 
 49. Id. at 35. 
 50. Id. at 49. 
 51. CRIMINAL PENALTIES STUDY COMM., FINAL REPORT 22 (1999). 
 52. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 55. 
 53. Id. at 50. 
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colleagues objected vociferously to the sentence-modification 
provision, characterizing it as contrary to the transparency goals of 
TIS I. “Truth-in-sentencing wasn’t necessarily to make sentences 
longer,” Walker declared, “it was to make them certain.”54 
Mounting cost concerns, however, pressured legislators to try to 
reach a compromise.55 Governor Scott McCallum, Thomson’s 
successor, made TIS II a priority, including it in a special budget 
bill.56 Ultimately, legislators on both sides agreed to a middle-ground 
resolution, permitting early-release petitions for less serious felonies 
after either seventy-five or eighty-five percent of the prison term had 
been served, depending on the seriousness of the felony.57 With that 
compromise achieved, TIS II—incorporating most of the proposals 
of the Criminal Penalties Study Committee and the new sentence-
modification provision—quickly became law.58 
TIS II thus reintroduced early release into Wisconsin law, and 
did so over legitimacy-oriented objections. However, movement 
away from the TIS ideal was modest. Moreover, by giving early-
release authority to judges, TIS II remained fully consistent with 
at least one of the legitimacy-based critiques of parole: that 
elected judges, and not appointed bureaucrats, should have the 
final say on punishment. 
C. TIS III: Expanding Early Release 
Once again, instrumental, cost-saving concerns carried the day in 
2009, when the legislature adopted several potentially important 
expansions to early release. TIS III differed from TIS II, though, in 
presenting a more direct challenge to the legitimacy rationales 
offered for truth in sentencing in Wisconsin. 
The modest 2002 reforms hardly brought about an immediate 
end to growth in Wisconsin’s prison population, which did not peak 
for another four years.59 Even after that peak, projections pointed to 
 
 54. Sarah Wyatt, Lawmakers at Odds Over Prison Time; Budget Bills Differ on Truth in 
Sentencing, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, April 7, 2002, at 2. 
 55. Sarah Wyatt, Costs Push Sentencing Law Toward a Moment of Truth; Long Terms 
Mean Huge Price Tag, CAPITAL TIMES, March 11, 2002, at 2A. 
 56. Scott Milfred, “Truth-in-Sentencing” on Agenda; McCallum Wants Action on the 
Revisions, WIS. STATE J., Jan. 13, 2002, at C1. 
 57. FONTAINE, supra note 20, at 55. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Supra Part I.A.1. 
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another twenty-five percent increase in the prison population by 
2019.60 In light of such projections, and facing a multibillion-dollar 
budgetary shortfall,61 Jim Doyle, now serving as governor, included in 
his 2009 state budget proposal an ambitious, though confusing, array 
of new early-release initiatives. Some of the important features 
included (1) creation of new opportunities for early release based on 
good behavior in prison, amounting to as much as one-third 
reduction of the prison term;62 (2) transfer of authority over the TIS II 
sentence-adjustment option from the judiciary to a new Earned 
Release Review Commission (“ERRC”);63 and (3) expansion of 
“compassionate release,” which permitted release by the ERRC for 
inmates based on terminal illness or other qualifying medical 
conditions.64 Public defenses of these reforms focused on their capacity 
to reduce the prison population and, consequently, corrections costs. 
To a lesser extent, proponents also argued that such programs would 
be instrumental in the rehabilitation of inmates.65 
Republicans wasted no time in castigating Doyle’s proposal as a 
“complete gutting of truth in sentencing.”66 Echoing the arguments 
originally made for TIS I, opponents of TIS III both invoked 
instrumental public-safety considerations and sounded legitimacy 
themes. “We’re not talking about Boy Scouts here,” said one 
Republican leader. “We’re talking about some dangerous people that 
are going to be released.”67 Another observed, “[w]ith judges you 
 
 60. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT IN WISCONSIN: ANALYSES & POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE SPENDING ON 
CORRECTIONS AND INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY 3 (2009). 
 61. See Mark Pitsch, Prisoner Proposal Defended; Critics Say Plan Guts Sentence Law, 
WIS. ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A1 (noting $5.9 billion budgetary shortfall). 
 62. Id. See also Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early Assessments and 
State-Level Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1574–75 (2012) (describing new “positive 
adjustment time” program in more detail). 
 63. Pitsch, supra note 61. See also Norris, supra note 62, at 1573–74 (describing 
changes in more detail). 
 64. Pitsch, supra note 61. See also Norris, supra note 62, at 1568–70 (describing 
changes in more detail). 
 65. See, e.g., Pitsch, supra note 61 (“The proposal, unveiled Tuesday as part of the 
state’s 2009–11 budget, could save millions of dollars while also providing rehabilitation 
incentives to prisoners, Corrections Secretary Rick Raemisch said.”); Steven Elbow, Doyle’s 
Vetoes Rankle Friends and Foes; Both Sides of the Aisle Irked as Governor Strips Budget of Key 
Prison Release Terms, CAPITAL TIMES, July 8, 2009, at 17 (“Doyle’s earned release plan was 
presented last spring as a way to chip away at a burgeoning prison population.”). 
 66. Pitsch, supra note 61.  
 67. Id. 
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have accountability. . . . Judges are elected and they’re re-elected by 
the people. The nameless faceless bureaucrats on this [ERRC] will be 
able to release whoever they want with no accountability.”68 
Despite such concerns, the Democrat-controlled legislature 
passed TIS III, and Governor Doyle signed it into law in July 
2009.69 These reforms, however, proved remarkably short-lived. 
D. TIS IV: Contracting Early Release 
Republicans swept to power after the 2010 elections, led by 
newly elected Governor Scott Walker.70 Walker had been the chief 
legislative proponent of truth in sentencing in 1998. Not 
surprisingly, he campaigned against TIS III in his run for the 
governorship and repealed it when he was elected.71 
Supporters of the repeal bill (TIS IV) reiterated the same sorts of 
criticisms of early release that they had articulated when opposing 
TIS III. Republican Representative Scott Suder, who was perhaps 
the most outspoken critic of TIS III, charged, “[e]arly release has 
allowed hundreds of high-risk inmates to get out of jail before 
serving their time . . . and Wisconsin will undoubtedly be a safer 
place to live, work and raise a family now that dangerous criminals 
will be kept behind bars where they belong.”72 To these criticisms, 
though, was added the charge that TIS III had not even proven 
much of a money saver.73 In its first year, for instance, only 158 
inmates were released early, which fell far short of the 500 to 1,000 
projected by Doyle.74 In light of persistently repeated charges that 
TIS III was a threat to public safety, it appears that the officials 
administering the highly discretionary early release programs grew 
increasingly restrictive.75 This restrictiveness, however, did not seem 
to lessen the public-safety criticisms, but merely served to undermine 
the cost-saving rationale for TIS III. 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Elbow, supra note 65. 
 70. Norris, supra note 62, at 1567. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Liam Marlaire, Walker Signs Bill Ending Early Release Program, LEADER-
TELEGRAM, July 20, 2011. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Ben Poston, Sentencing Reform Results Fall Short; Early Prison Releases, Cost Savings 
Are a Fraction of Year-Ago Estimate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 11, 2010, at 1. 
 75. Id. 
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E. Lessons: A Preliminary Consideration 
The adoption and survival of the TIS II sentence-adjustment 
reform suggests that Wisconsin’s political system can accept modest 
reductions in penal severity in the name of cost savings, at least so 
long as the ultimate control over release is held by the judiciary. 
Support for the truth in sentencing ideal is not so unyielding as to 
preclude any flexibility at all on the back end of a prison term. 
However, the failure of TIS III—repeatedly attacked for “gutting” 
truth in sentencing—suggests there may be limits to how far the 
state can move from the original vision of TIS I without provoking a 
powerful political backlash. 
It is unclear whether TIS III might have fared better if it had 
been designed or presented somewhat differently. What if, for 
instance, severity had been relaxed a little less? If elected judges had 
retained their decision-making role in lieu of the ERRC’s “nameless 
faceless bureaucrats”? If certain components of TIS III had been 
omitted, such as the revival of good time or the expansion of 
compassionate release? 
In her assessment of the disappointing experience with early 
release reforms in Wisconsin and a handful of other states, Professor 
Cecelia Klingele of Wisconsin Law School ultimately focuses less on 
such design considerations than on the way that reforms are publicly 
justified. She argues, 
[M]ost importantly, lawmakers who want to reduce prison 
populations must frame early release efforts as one small part of a 
larger and more important effort to combat the injustices that flow 
from mass imprisonment. . . . If policymakers want to promote 
lasting change, they must be willing to meet moral criticisms of 
early release with normative responses of their own. 
Politicians and policymakers have asserted that decreasing the 
prison population is a way to be “smart on crime” and to 
demonstrate fiscal stewardship over dwindling state resources. 
While these statements technically may be true, and while they may 
persuade the public to support such measures in the short term, 
they are unlikely to be satisfactory justifications for practices that 
are not also seen as fundamentally fair.76 
 
 76. Klingele, supra note 7, at 456–57. 
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Our polling research might be thought of as an effort to test 
Klingele’s claim and to unpack what might make an early release 
program “fundamentally fair” in the eyes of the public. In light of 
the conceptual framework developed earlier in this Part, we might 
recast this project as an inquiry into the role of noninstrumental 
thinking (that is, of legitimacy and symbolic considerations) in 
shaping public attitudes toward TIS and early release. 
More specifically, we focus on the importance of fear of crime 
(an instrumental consideration) and preference for elected judges 
over an unelected expert commission (a legitimacy consideration) as 
predictors for support of TIS. We also focus on the importance of 
community cohesion, which relates to symbolic theories of 
punishment. We hypothesize that individuals lacking confidence in 
the moral cohesion of their communities would be more likely to 
support TIS because of its symbolic value as a reassertion of moral 
order and accountability. 
II. DATA AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
To test the three possible explanations (instrumental, legitimacy-
directed, symbolic) concerning public support for TIS in Wisconsin, 
we analyzed survey data collected from the Marquette University Law 
School Poll in July 2012, July 2013, and July 2014.77 The findings we 
report here are based chiefly on the 2013 poll, which included the 
most extensive survey items regarding sentencing policy and concerns 
about crime more generally. However, there are select survey items 
unique to the 2012 and 2014 waves of data collection, so we will 
present some analysis of those data as well. To the extent that 
questions were repeated, similar questions elicited similar responses, 
which points to stability in the underlying public attitudes. 
The 2013 poll was comprised of 713 Wisconsin registered 
voters.78 Both landline (seventy-eight percent of the sample) and cell 
phone (twenty percent of the sample) numbers were included in the 
 
 77. Founded in 2012, the Marquette University Law School Poll conducts regular 
surveys of Wisconsin voters on state and national politics and public policy. More information 
about the poll is available through its website (https://law.marquette.edu/poll/). We are very 
grateful to our colleague Charles Franklin, the poll’s director, for collaborating with us in the 
sentencing-focused surveys of 2012–2014. 
 78. Complete results and data from July 2013 and all of the Marquette University Law 
School Poll surveys can be found at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/results-data/. 
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random digit dialing (RDD) technique.79 Recent survey data 
research suggests that including cell phone numbers is important for 
generalizability as more United States residents, especially individuals 
under thirty years old, rely on cell phones as their primary or only 
telephone number.80 The margin of error for a single percentage in a 
sample of 713 respondents is +/- 3.7 percentage points.81 Additional 
technical details are set forth in the footnotes.82 
Administered in a similar manner, the 2012 poll was comprised 
of 697 registered voters and had a margin of error of +/- 3.8 
percentage points.83 Likewise, the 2014 poll was comprised of 804 
registered voters and had a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percentage 
points.84 Unless otherwise indicated in the text, readers should 
assume that all findings reported here are based on the 2013 poll. 
We focus our analysis on a number of variables. The first are three 
measures of support for TIS. These questions ask respondents to agree 
or disagree with following statements: “Truth in sentencing sends a 
message that society will not tolerate crime”; “Truth in sentencing 
helps to reduce crime and make Wisconsin safer”; and “Truth in 
 
 79. LHK Partners Inc. managed all the actual data collection. 
 80. Carl Bialik, Pollsters Go Mobile, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/numbersguy/pollsters-go-mobile-1103/. 
 81. Marquette University Law School Poll, Methodology, Marquette Law School Poll 
(July 2013), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/MLSP17Methodology.pdf. 
 82. The survey itself utilizes a post-stratification approach: a weighting procedure that 
compensates for patterns of non-response that shift sample characteristics from known 
population values. In telephone survey research, it is common for certain groups to be over-
represented in populations of individuals that do not participate and are consequently under-
represented in survey samples. For example, individuals with fewer years of formal schooling 
than the general population and younger individuals are among the population of potential 
respondents that are less likely to participate in surveys. To adjust for this potential source of 
bias, responses from these respondents are weighted to align with general U.S. population 
values. (In this sample the population values of age groups, education levels, and sex were 
determined by combining the 2008 and 2012 Current Population Surveys conducted by the 
U.S. Census in Wisconsin to estimate the distribution of age, education and sex for registered 
voters in the state.) Finally, a “raking” procedure was used to simultaneously balance the 
weights so that the sample distribution closely approximates the known population 
distributions for age, education and sex. 
 83. Marquette University Law School Poll, Methodology, Marquette Law School Poll 
(July 5–8, 2012), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ 
MLSP8_Methdology.pdf. 
 84. Marquette University Law School Poll, Methodology, Marquette Law School Poll 
(July 2014), http://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ 
MLSP22Methodology.pdf. 
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sentencing should continue to be the law in Wisconsin.”85 In order to 
account for the possibility that survey respondents were not familiar 
with TIS laws in Wisconsin, we also provided a prompt explaining TIS 
laws, which read, “Laws that ban parole and require prisoners to serve 
the full term of their sentences, regardless of what they do in prison, 
are often called ‘truth in sentencing’ laws. Wisconsin adopted a truth 
in sentencing law in 1998.”86 This step in data collection addresses the 
potential critique that our results stem from public ignorance of TIS 
laws, instead of genuine views towards this policy. Responses were 
recoded so that higher values represent greater support for TIS laws. 
Unless otherwise indicated, our findings concerning TIS refer to an 
index created by combining all three TIS items into a single variable. 
Reliability analysis indicates that these three items measure a similar 
underlying concept (alpha = .833). 
Another important variable in analysis of the data is a question 
about early release: “Once a prisoner has served at least half of his 
term, he should be released from prison and given a less costly form 
of punishment if he can demonstrate that he is no longer a threat to 
society.”87 Respondents were this time asked to strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly disagree with that statement. Again, responses 
were recoded so that higher values indicate greater support for this 
item. We also examined the impact of numerous demographic 
characteristics on both TIS and early release including gender (coded 
as Male = 1, Female = 0), political orientation,88 race (white = 1, all 
other races = 0), education (college educated or higher = 1, all other 
= 0), age (measured in years), religiosity (more frequent church 
attendance = higher values), religious denomination (Catholic = 1, 
all else = 0), and resident of Milwaukee County (resident = 1, non-
resident = 0). There are a number of additional measures we examine 
in this study that will be discussed in greater depth in the analyses 
sections below. Table 1 contains a full list of descriptive statistics of 
the demographic variables included in the analyses. 
 
 85. Marquette University Law School Poll, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL, July 15-
18, 2013, Q21-23 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Toplines]. 
 86. Marquette University Law School Poll, Instrument, Marquette Law School Poll July 
15–18, 2013, at 8 (2013), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/MLSP17Instrument.pdf. 
 87. 2013 Toplines, supra note 85, Q19. 
 88. This variable asks respondents to describe their own political views as “very 
conservative”(5), “conservative”(4), “moderate”(3), “liberal”(2), or “very liberal”(1).  
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Table 1. Summary of Demographic Variables for Total Sample  
Variable N % 
Sex    
 Male 340 47.7 
 Female 373 52.3 
Age    
 Mean years 695 49.9 
Education    
 Less than college  380 53.3 
 College or greater  327 46.3 
Race    
 White 632 88.7 
 Other  60 8.6 
Ethnicity    
 Hispanic 17 2.4 
 Non-Hispanic 689 97.6 
Marital Status    
 Married 417 58.4 
 Other  292 41.2 
Political Orientation    
 Very conservative  67 9.9 
 Conservative 204 30 
 Moderate  235 34.4 
 Liberal 124 18.2 
 Very liberal  51 7.6 
Religion    
 Catholic 214 30.1 
 Other 485 69.3 
Church Attendance   
 More than once a week 54 7.8 
 Once a week  206 29.4 
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 A few times a month 130 18.6 
 A few times a year 102 14.6 
 Seldom 119 17 
 Never 89 12.7 
Milwaukee County   
 Live in Milwaukee County 116 16.4 
 Does not live in Milwaukee 
County 
593 83.6 
 
We used the following analytic strategy: First, we examined the 
level of support for TIS laws. Then we examined bivariate 
relationships between support for TIS and factors that would seem 
to explain its support. We used the conceptual framing set forth in 
Part I above to identify variables that might share a bivariate 
relationship with the TIS composite index. To examine the viability 
of the instrumental explanation, we examined the link between fear 
of crime and support for TIS.89 To measure concerns about the 
legitimacy of the release decisions, we detected for a relationship 
between support for TIS and views toward which body should make 
release decisions, the original (elected) sentencing judges or a 
statewide commission of experts. Responses that replied “original 
sentencing judge” were coded as “1.” To supplement these analyses, 
we also examined the link between TIS and an item in the 2012 data 
set that asked respondents to report whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement, “It would be better to have an expert 
commission set state sentencing policies, rather than elected 
politicians.”90 To account for the role of symbolic justifications for 
TIS support, we investigated potential links between support for TIS 
and three indicators of community cohesion. 
 
 89. We did not attempt to measure another instrumental consideration, cost sensitivity, 
because this consideration does not seem likely to explain support for TIS. However, cost 
sensitivity might explain support for early release. Exploring this relationship further would be 
a helpful focus for future research.  
 90. 2013 Toplines, supra note 85, at Q36. Our legitimacy measures focus on 
democratic accountability, which has been a particular issue in the recent political debates 
regarding TIS III and TIS IV. Supra Parts I.C. and I.D. In the original debate over TIS I, 
another legitimacy consideration, transparency, also figured prominently in the discussion. 
Supra Part I.A.3. Since transparency seems to have played a lesser role in more recent debates, 
we have not included it in our analysis. 
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Following the bivariate analysis, we then estimated a series of 
multivariate OLS regression models91 where the TIS index was 
specified as the dependent variable. We then repeated these steps of 
analysis for the early release variable except the multivariate regression 
models. We recoded early release into a dummy variable (1 = strongly 
agree or agree, 0 = strongly disagree or disagree) and then estimated 
the coefficients for binary logistics regression models. Lastly, we 
conducted a series of bivariate analyses for different subsamples of the 
data paying specific attention to the group of respondents that both 
supports TIS laws and supports early release—two seemingly disparate 
and conflicting views toward sentencing policy. 
III. SUPPORT FOR TRUTH IN SENTENCING 
We found that most respondents support TIS. Specifically, 76.1% 
of respondents agreed that “truth in sentencing sends a message that 
society will not tolerate crime”; 62.5% agreed that “TIS helps reduce 
crime”; and 71.3% indicated that they felt TIS should continue to be 
the law in Wisconsin. Otherwise stated, there is strong and 
consistent support for TIS among sample respondents. The mean for 
the TIS index is 2.09 on a variable that ranges from zero to three, 
supporting the notion that those surveyed demonstrate strong 
support for these laws.92 
In the bivariate analysis, we found little evidence that 
instrumental explanations fuel TIS support. The TIS index does not 
share a statistically significant relationship with the fear-of-crime 
measure.93 Moreover, consistent with this conclusion, we found in 
 
 91. OLS regression, or Ordinary Least Squares, is a regression estimator well suited for 
normally distributed continuous data. Under these data conditions, OLS is an efficient and 
unbiased estimator. In a multivariate context, we can statistically isolate the effect of a given 
variable in the model. 
 92. Additional support for the strength of this conclusion comes from an ordering 
experiment we conducted in the 2012 poll. In that survey, we randomly varied whether 
respondents were asked first about TIS or about corrections costs and prisoner rehabilitation. 
We hypothesized that respondents would be less likely to support TIS if they were first 
prompted to think about its potential negative effects. However, we found no significant 
difference in support of TIS based on the order of the questions; TIS supporters apparently 
stuck to their position even with the costs in mind. 
 93. In general, statistical significance refers to the probability that the results are not due 
to random chance alone. There are varying null hypotheses for each test of significance (for 
example in this paper, we employ chi-square and t-tests) so the specific inferences also vary. P 
values represent the level of statistical certainty that the results are not due to random chance; 
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the 2012 poll that about seventy-eight percent of the respondents 
who favored TIS also agreed that “even if truth in sentencing does 
not reduce crime, it would still be the right thing to do.”94 Indeed, 
in 2013, fifteen percent of the TIS supporters expressly disclaimed 
any belief in instrumental public-safety benefits.95 
By contrast, we did find evidence in the bivariate analysis that 
notions of legitimacy may explain some of the variation in support for 
TIS. Support for TIS shares a modest, yet positive and statistically 
significant bivariate relationship with respondents preferring 
sentencing judges to make release decisions (r = .179).96 This finding 
also replicates for the 2012 data set. In these data, respondents who 
supported elected politicians setting state sentencing policies over a 
commission of experts were also significantly more likely to support 
TIS, although this relationship is fairly weak (.097). These results 
suggest that public support for TIS does, in part, result from a 
preference for democratically accountable decision makers over 
unaccountable experts or bureaucrats—a finding that is consistent 
with much of the rhetoric from the politicians who originally 
supported the adoption of TIS in Wisconsin.97 
The bivariate analysis produced ambiguous results with respect 
to symbolic support for TIS. Again, we utilized three different 
questions relating to community cohesion. The first (“The people in 
my community really care about their neighbors”) was not 
significantly correlated with TIS support. The third (“It would not 
bother me too much to move from here into some other 
community”) was significantly correlated in the expected direction: 
individuals who felt no special attachment to their communities of 
residence were more likely to support TIS. The second (“Most 
people in my community share the same basic values that I do”) was 
also significantly correlated, but in an unexpected direction: 
 
p < .1 signifies less than a ten percent chance that the results are due to random chance; p < 
.05, less than a five percent chance; and p < .01, less than a one percent chance. 
 94. Marquette University Law School Poll, Marquette Law School Poll Toplines (July 
5–8, 2012), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/results-data/ [hereinafter 2012 Toplines]. 
 95. This number was calculated by comparing responses to questions 22 and 23. 
 96. Correlation coefficients of association, or R statistics, indicate the direction and 
strength of a relationship between two variables and ranges between 1 and -1. Estimates close 
to 0 indicate a weak relationship while coefficients close to either 1 or -1 suggest a strong one. 
In addition, a positive estimate indicates that the two variables co-vary in the same direction 
and a negative relationship indicates that as one variable increases the other decreases. 
 97. Supra Part I.A.3. 
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individuals who perceive themselves to be living in morally 
homogenous communities were more, not less, likely to support TIS. 
One possible way of accounting for the latter surprising result is 
that individuals who live in morally homogenous communities 
generally do so by choice and probably at least in part due to their 
discomfort with the diversity found in society more generally. 
Although satisfied with conditions in their own suburban and rural 
enclaves, they may nonetheless favor symbolic assertions of moral 
order through law as a response to the perceived moral chaos 
emanating from more diverse communities elsewhere in the state. 
Our surveys were not designed to test this particular hypothesis, but 
it would be consistent with earlier research conducted on public 
support for punitive policies.98 
 
Table 2. OLS Regression of the Truth in 
Sentencing Index99 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B Stand B B Stand B 
Demographic 
measures 
    
Men -.255** -.107 -.246** -.103 
Age -.002 -.024 -.002 -.026 
White  -.489** -.113 -.441** -.102 
Hispanic .093 .013 .208 .029 
College degree -.231** -.097 -.155 -.065 
Married -.088 .-036 -.126 -.052 
Political 
orientation  
 .301*** .268 .278*** .248 
Catholic  .168 .064 .155 .06 
Church 
attendance 
.047 .06 .044 .056 
 
 98. See Tyler & Boeckmann, supra note 47, at 253 (finding a statistically significant 
relationship between punitiveness and concerns about social diversity in state as a whole, but 
not between punitiveness and concerns about community cohesion). 
 99. In OLS regression, the coefficient for each independent variable (“B”) can be 
interpreted as the amount changed in the dependent variable for a one unit increase in the 
independent variable. In Table 2, we also report standardized B (“Stand B”), which takes into 
account differing metrics of measurement so that B’s can be compared directly to each other 
for relative effect magnitude on the dependent variable.  
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Milwaukee -.495** -.157 -.462** -.146 
     
Instrumental      
Fear of crime   -.001 -.001 
     
Legitimacy     
Judges should 
decide sentence 
  .312** .122 
 
     
Symbolic     
Neighbors care   -.037 -.024 
Neighbors share 
vales 
  .117* .082 
Not bothered by 
moving 
  .067 .046 
     
R2 .132  .157  
N 520  520  
p< .1*, p < 0.05**, p< 0.01*** 
Turning to the multivariate regression, our results are divided 
into two separate models so that we can observe changes across the 
regression estimates after we introduce indicators of the 
instrumental, legitimacy, and symbolic explanations for TIS support. 
Results of the multivariate OLS Model 1 with only demographic 
variables indicate that five of these predictors are statistically 
significant predictors of TIS. The first measure, political orientation, 
indicates that as respondents become more politically conservative, 
they become more likely to support TIS (.301; p <.001). Otherwise 
stated, statistically controlling for the other covariates in the model, 
as respondents become more conservative, their support for TIS 
increases by .301. Keeping in mind that the TIS index ranges from 0 
to 3, this is a sizeable impact for a single variable. 
Living in Milwaukee County (home of Wisconsin’s largest urban 
center) is also a statistically significant predictor of TIS support, but 
shares a statistically negative relationship with the dependent 
variables (-.495; p < .01). Thus, respondents who live in Milwaukee 
County are less likely to support TIS than respondents living 
elsewhere in the state. White respondents (-.489; p < .05), men (-
.255; p < .05), and those with a college degree (-.231; p < .05) are 
also significantly less likely to support TIS. Standardized regression 
OHEAR WHEELOCK.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
257 Imprisonment Inertia 
 283 
coefficients indicate that political conservatism (.268) is the single 
most influential demographic predictor in shaping views towards 
TIS, with a strong positive correlation between conservatism and 
support for the policy. 
Interestingly, we see early evidence that support for TIS stems 
from diverse sources and may be conceptually distinct from the 
broader notion of punitive attitudes and support for capital 
punishment. In a considerable body of scholarship on punitive 
attitudes and support for capital punishment, researchers have 
consistently found, holding political and other variables constant, 
that being male or white either has no impact on the desire to punish 
or is positively correlated with punitive attitudes when there is a 
statistically significant relationship.100 Yet, our results indicate starkly 
different patterns. Central demographic predictors here have the 
opposite effect on support for TIS compared to more generalized 
desires to punish law violators. This empirical evidence lends support 
for the notion that support for TIS differs from the general desire to 
punish in key respects. 
Model 2 in Table 2 includes both demographic measures and key 
indicators of the three potential explanations we discussed above. 
Results at this stage in the analysis indicate that, as in Model 1, 
political conservatism (.278; p < .001), living in Milwaukee County 
(-.462; p < .01), being male (-.202; p < .05), and being white (-
.441; p < .05) are again statistically significant demographic 
predictors of support for TIS, either in a negative or a positive 
direction. However, the college-educated measure is no longer 
significant in Model 2, suggesting that its impact on TIS support has 
been absorbed by the key explanatory variables (a 32.9 percent 
coefficient reduction).101 
 
 100. See, e.g., Darren Wheelock et al., Perceived Group Threat and Punitive Attitudes in 
Russia and the United States, 61 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 937 (2011); Ryan King & Darren 
Wheelock, Group Threat and Social Control: Race, Perceptions of Minorities, and the Desire to 
Punish, 85 SOC. FORCES 1255 (2007); S.E. Barkan & S.F. Cohn, Contemporary Regional 
Differences in Support by Whites for the Death Penalty: A Research Note, 27 JUST. Q. 458 
(2010); E.P. Baumer et al., Explaining Spatial Variation in Support for Capital Punishment: A 
Multilevel Analysis, 108 AM. J. SOC. 844 (2003). 
 101. There are two factors that lead variables to become non-significant across models. 
Either the standard error increases or the coefficient itself decreases suggesting that the new 
covariates are taking up the variation previously explained by the now non-significant variable. 
The college variable drops from -.231 to -.155. To calculate the percent change, (-.155-(-
.231))/-.231 = 32.9 percent reduction. 
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The results of Model 2 also indicate that the instrumental 
explanation as measured by fear of crime is not a salient factor to 
explain TIS support, which is consistent with the findings from the 
bivariate analysis.102 By contrast, as in the bivariate analysis, our 
legitimacy variable (preference for judges over experts) did prove 
statistically significant in Model 2 (.312; p < .01). As to our symbolic 
measures—the three community cohesion variables—only one was 
statistically significant in Model 2: “most people in my community 
share the same basic values that I do.” As in the bivariate analysis, 
the direction of correlation was the opposite of what the symbolic 
explanation would predict (.117; p < .05). Standardized coefficients 
again indicate that the political orientation measure (.248) continues 
to be the strongest predictor, but the “judge” measure (.122) is the 
strongest predictor among the central explanatory variables. In sum, 
net of demographic controls, the analysis of the data lends strongest 
evidentiary support for the legitimacy explanation of why Wisconsin 
residents support TIS.103 
IV. CREDIBLE EARLY RELEASE REFORMS 
Although we have found strong public support for TIS, we have 
also found significant support for providing early release from prison 
in certain circumstances. The latter results from Wisconsin are 
consistent with the results of a number of national polls. (However, 
we are not aware of any recent polls, other than ours, that have 
tested for support of TIS per se.) In this Part, we first describe the 
national polls. Then, we discuss our central finding on early release, 
 
 102. It is also consistent with our analysis of 2012 survey data, where there was a 
different question concerning crime and public safety. That survey asked respondents whether 
they agreed or disagreed with the claim that “[t]he crime problem has been getting worse in 
my community over the past few years.” It is not significant in all 2012 multivariate regression 
models where support for TIS is the dependent variable. However, we are cautious in making 
direct comparisons between the 2012 and 2013 results because sample sizes and model 
specifications are considerably different. 
 103. Unfortunately, data are not available to answer the historical question of whether 
the same concerns predominated in public attitudes at the time that TIS I was originally 
adopted. We believe, however, that the public attitudes we are measuring do have some 
stability over time. To the extent we asked the same questions in 2012 and 2013, we had very 
similar responses. Moreover, our results were broadly consistent with a set of national polls 
conducted from 2006 to 2012, as discussed in Part IV below. We note, too, that multi-decade 
national research indicates more generally that “[p]unitive sentiment moves slowly over time 
with few periods of abrupt change.” Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 
329, 340 (2013). 
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that a majority of respondents would favor the release of prisoners 
who have served at least half of their sentences if they can 
demonstrate that they no longer pose a threat to public safety. 
Finally, we discuss additional findings from our survey that identify 
specific features that Wisconsin voters would like to see in an early 
release program. 
A. National Polls 
At least four national surveys conducted in recent years have 
found strong public support for reduced use of imprisonment in the 
United States for some offenders. These surveys were sponsored by 
the Pew Center on the States (2012 and 2010),104 the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency (2009),105 and the National 
Center for State Courts (2006).106 While the three organizations had 
different areas of focus and asked somewhat different questions, their 
results generally paint a consistent picture. 
First, there is considerable interest in reducing the size of the U.S. 
prison population. The Pew Center found that forty-five percent of 
respondents believe that we lock up too many people today, as 
compared to only twenty-eight percent who believe that the prison 
population is “about right” and thirteen percent who think we lock up 
too few.107 In part, these attitudes may reflect fiscal concerns. For 
instance, seventy-eight percent said that it would be acceptable to 
reduce prison time for low-risk, nonviolent offenders in order to close 
budget deficits.108 However, there seems some ambivalence about the 
extent to which reducing the prison population or corrections 
spending should be ends in themselves. The National Center for State 
Courts found that only thirty-eight percent of respondents in 2006 
said it was “very important” to reduce the prison population, and only 
twenty-two percent said that spending on prisons should be 
 
 104. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AMERICA (2012) [hereinafter PEW 2012];PEW CENTER ON THE 
STATES, NATIONAL RESEARCH OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (2010) 
[hereinafter PEW 2010]. 
 105. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF U.S. VOTERS 
TOWARD NONSERIOUS OFFENDERS AND ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION (2009). 
 106. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, THE NCSC 
SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS (2006). 
 107. PEW 2012, supra note 104, at 2. 
 108. Id. at 4. 
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decreased.109 It is possible that these numbers would be higher today 
in the wake of the post-2006 economic downturn and resulting fiscal 
pressures on state governments. 
However, even in more recent surveys, it appears that the public 
desires less to reduce corrections spending per se than to reallocate 
the dollars in ways that more cost effectively protect public safety. 
Here are some of the results: 
 
• Eighty-four percent agree that “[s]ome of the money 
that we are spending on locking up low-risk, nonviolent 
inmates should be shifted to strengthening community 
corrections programs like probation and parole.”110 
• Eighty-five percent would accept reducing prison time 
for low-risk, nonviolent offenders in order to reinvest in 
alternatives.111 
• Eighty-seven percent agree that “[p]risons are a 
government program, and just like any other government 
program they need to be put to the cost-benefit test to 
make sure taxpayers are getting the best bang for their 
buck.”112 
• Sixty percent say that sending fewer non-serious 
offenders to prison may be justified by the availability of 
alternatives that decrease reoffending.113 
 
Implicit in these findings are beliefs that rehabilitation is a 
feasible goal for many offenders, but that prisons are not the best 
place to pursue rehabilitative objectives. These views are more 
explicit in a number of other findings: 
 
• Only thirty-three percent say that prisons are at least 
somewhat successful at rehabilitating offenders.114 
 
 109. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 106, at 
38, 21. 
 110. PEW 2012, supra note 104, at 1. 
 111. Id. at 4. 
 112. Id. at 7. 
 113. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 105, at 8.  
 114. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 106, at 
17. 
OHEAR WHEELOCK.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
257 Imprisonment Inertia 
 287 
• Fifty-eight percent say that prevention or rehabilitation 
should be the top priority for dealing with crime, as 
opposed to only nineteen percent who favor longer 
sentences and more prisons.115 
• Seventy-nine percent agree that “under the right 
conditions, many offenders can turn their 
lives around.”116 
• Sixty-one percent said it was “very important” to put nonviolent 
offenders in treatment/job/education programs.117 
• Eighty-seven percent agree that “[i]t does not matter 
whether a nonviolent offender is in prison for 18 or 24 
[or] 30 months . . . . What really matters is that the 
system does a better job of making sure that when an 
offender does get out, he is less likely to commit 
another crime.”118 
 
Public opinion seems considerably more favorable to prison 
alternatives for nonviolent than violent offenders. Indeed, some of the 
support for reducing prison time for the former seems based precisely 
on the perceived need to preserve prison space for the latter. Thus, for 
instance, the Pew Center found that eighty-six percent would accept 
reduced prison time for nonviolent offenders in order “to keep violent 
offenders locked up.”119 Similarly, the National Center for State 
Courts found that seventy-two percent thought it was “very 
important” to keep violent offenders in prison longer.120 
For the nonviolent offenders, though, the public seems open to 
early release in a number of circumstances. The Pew Center found 
that eighty-six percent would accept reduced prison time for 
completion of programs, eighty-three percent for good behavior in 
prison, and seventy-seven percent for age or illness.121 Likewise, the 
National Center for Crime and Delinquency found that seventy-
seven percent favored alternatives to prison for “nonviolent, 
 
 115. Id. at 20. 
 116. Id. at 22. 
 117. Id. at 38. 
 118. PEW 2012, supra note 104, at 5. 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 
106, at 38. 
 121. PEW 2012, supra note 104, at 4. 
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nonsexual” offenders whose crime “did not involve significant 
property loss.”122 
However, a few caveats are in order. The National Center for 
State Courts found that eighty-one percent of respondents believe 
that it is “very important” for criminal-justice systems to do more 
“to make sure the punishment fits the crime.”123 This 
retributive/symbolic view stands in tension with the more clearly 
instrumental, cost-benefit-balancing perspective evident in some of 
the other survey responses. Additionally, the Pew Center found 
substantial skepticism of the adequacy of community supervision as a 
punishment; fifty percent characterized probation and parole as a 
“slap on the wrist.”124 This may point to resistance to early release in 
cases of serious crime, even if the risk of re-offense is very low. 
Finally, there appears to be widespread public distrust of many of the 
officials who work in the system. In one survey, only thirty-seven 
percent said that judges were doing a good job of serving the public, 
and only twenty-five percent said as much of prison, probation, and 
parole authorities.125 
B. Support for Early Release in Wisconsin 
We found consistent support for early release among our 
Wisconsin sample of registered voters. In the 2012 data, fifty-five 
percent agreed that “[o]nce a prisoner has served at least half of his 
term, he should be released from prison and given a less costly form 
of punishment if he can demonstrate that he is no longer a threat to 
society.”126 Only thirty-five percent disagreed.127 Similarly, in 2013, 
54.5% agreed, while only 41.4% disagreed.128 
This level of support for early release is especially remarkable 
because of the specification of a generous halfway release point. We 
hypothesized that more modest, or less specific, reductions in 
sentence length would draw even higher levels of support. For 
 
 122. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 105, at 6. 
 123. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 106, at 38. 
 124. PEW 2012, supra note 104, at 7. 
 125. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, supra note 106, at 16. 
 126. 2012 Toplines, supra note 94, at Q26g. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Marquette University Law School Poll, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL, July 
15-18, 2013, Q19 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Toplines], 
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/results-data/. 
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instance, in response to another early release question in the 2012 
data, we had found that two-thirds agreed “Wisconsin should 
recognize prisoners’ rehabilitative accomplishments by awarding 
credits toward early release.”129 We tested, and confirmed, our 
hypothesis in the 2014 poll, in which we found that 66.4% agreed 
that “[i]f a prisoner serves two-thirds of his term, he should be 
released and given a less costly form of punishment if he can 
demonstrate that he is no longer a threat to society.”130 
Notably, we found this support for early release even without 
distinguishing between violent and nonviolent offenders. The 
national polling results discussed above suggest that we may have 
found even higher levels of support if we had narrowed the focus of 
the question to nonviolent offenders. 
We analyzed the survey data to identify predictors for early 
release support, that is, support for the specific halfway proposal 
described above. The results of the bivariate analysis131 demonstrate 
little evidence of either fear of crime or community cohesion 
variables being significant correlates of early release support. There 
is, however, evidence that the legitimacy variable (judges versus 
experts) helps to account for variation in early release views. Chi-
square tests indicate that these two variables share a statistically 
significant relationship (p < .001); respondents who agree that 
judges should determine sentences are more likely to disagree that 
prisoners should be considered for early release.132 This finding 
conforms to our TIS regression analysis. Based on that analysis, one 
would expect, precisely as we find, that individuals who place a high 
value on the democratic accountability of judges and therefore 
support TIS would be especially skeptical of any early release 
proposal. Given the historical functioning of parole, they would 
likely assume early release to be administratively, rather than 
judicially, implemented. 
 
 129. 2012 Toplines, supra note 94, at Q26c. 
 130. Marquette University Law School Poll, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL, July 17-
20, 2014, Q30 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Toplines], http://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/MLSP22Toplines.pdf. 
 131. Because this variable is categorical, we employed cross-tabulation chi-square tests 
instead of estimating correlation matrices and R coefficients as was the case with the TIS index. 
 132. See infra Table 3, at 33. 
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The results of the binary logistic regression models133 are 
separated into two models, one comprising just the demographic 
covariates and the second consisting of the full selection of variables, 
including variables that capture the three explanations for TIS 
support that we explored above. 
 
Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression of Early Release Variable 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
     
Demographic measures     
Men .285 1.33 .327* 1.387 
Age -.002 .998 -.004 .996 
White -1.59 .853 -.248 .78 
College degree .107 1.113 .031 1.031 
Hispanic  -.068 .934 -.063 .939 
Married -
.618*** 
.539 -
.589*** 
.555 
Political orientation  -
.622*** 
.537 -.6*** .549 
Catholic -.253 .776 -.228 .796 
Church attendance .102 1.107 .1 1.105 
Milwaukee .604** 1.83 .635** 1.887 
     
Instrumental      
Fear of crime   -.039 .961 
     
Legitimacy     
Judges should decide 
sentence 
  -
.577*** 
.555 
     
Symbolic     
Neighbors care   .104 1.11 
Neighbors share vales   .061 1.063 
Not bothered by   -.008 .992 
 
 133. The OLS estimator is not appropriate for categorical dependent variables because it 
generates biased and even regression coefficients that cannot be interpreted (for example, ones 
that would produce negative probabilities). Since we recoded the Early Release variable to have 
only two possible categories, we utilize binary logistic regression models and a Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) estimator. The B then can be interpreted as the effect on the 
logistic probability unit, or the logit, of the dependent variable. Since the logit function is not 
intuitive when discussing results, exponentiating B coefficients (Exp B) yields the effect on 
the odds. 
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moving 
     
N 568  568  
p< .1*, p < 0.05**, p< 0.01*** 
The results of Model 1 demonstrate that married respondents are 
less likely to support early release. In fact, the odds that married 
respondents would agree with early release were forty-six percent less 
than the odds for non-married individuals. Being politically 
conservative is also a negative predictor of support for early release (a 
forty-six percent reduction in the odds). Finally, respondents residing 
in Milwaukee County are statistically more likely to support early 
release. Specifically, the odds that these respondents support early 
release are eighty-three percent higher than those of respondents 
living elsewhere in Wisconsin. 
The full early release model with both demographic controls and 
key explanatory factors shows that the effects of being married (-.59; 
p < .01), political conservatism (-.60; p < .001), and residing in 
Milwaukee County (.64; p < .001) remain statistically significant in 
Model 2. However, in Model 2, being male is statistically significant 
net of the other covariates in the model (.33; p < .1). The 
exponentiated beta coefficient shows that being male increases the 
odds of supporting early release by thirty-nine percent. Of the three 
central explanations, only the indicator for the legitimacy explanation 
is statistically significant.134 Respondents who feel that judges should 
handle sentencing are approximately forty-four percent less likely to 
support early release. 
C. Program Specifics 
Although a number of national-level polls have found substantial 
public support for early release as a general concept, they leave many 
 
 134. We note, though, that our instrumental variable, fear of crime, does not capture 
what is likely the most important instrumental consideration supporting early release: cost-
savings. On the other hand, in the 2012 Poll, a clear majority (fifty-eight percent) of 
respondents agreed with the statement, “[e]ven if such an earned-release program, [providing 
credits based on rehabilitative accomplishments in prison], does not reduce crime, it would still 
be the right thing to do.” 2012 Toplines, supra note 94, at Q26d. Similarly, in the 2014 Poll, 
we found no statistically significant relationship, in either a bivariate or a multivariate model, 
between support for early release and support for the proposition that “[r]educing the amount 
of money we spend on imprisoning criminals” is either “absolutely essential” or “very 
important.” For the topline results, see 2014 Toplines, supra note 130, Q28e, 30. 
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unanswered questions as to the specifics of program design. Our 
research provides new insights into what sort of an early release 
program voters might see as more acceptable. 
First, we found much higher public support for putting release 
decisions in the hands of a statewide commission of experts than in 
the hands of judges. Fifty-two percent of our respondents favored 
the expert commission, as against 31.3% preferring judges.135 This 
result suggests that TIS III, which created the ERRC in Wisconsin, 
got it right from the standpoint of institutional design, while TIS IV, 
which eliminated the ERRC and restored judicial control over early 
release, got it wrong.136 Indeed, in our research, respondents 
considered a commission to be superior to a judge along five of six 
different performance dimensions.137 A judge was said to be slightly 
better at evaluating the seriousness of the prisoner’s crime, but a 
commission was determined to be superior in a wide range of other 
tasks—most decisively, in using the latest scientific knowledge on 
rehabilitation and risk (58.7% to 12.5%) and in ensuring fair and 
equal treatment (44.7% to 20.6%).138 It is notable that a judge’s 
advantage in assessing the seriousness of an offense did not control 
the bottom-line judge-versus-commission decision; this underscores 
that making the punishment fit the crime was not seen as a singular, 
overriding objective of the penal system, but stands as only one of a 
number of purposes.139 
These findings echo the distrust of judges evident in national 
polls.140 However, polls also find similar or greater distrust of 
corrections officials.141 We did not ask our respondents questions 
 
 135. 2013 Toplines, supra note 128, at Q36. 
 136. See supra Part I.C–D. 
 137. 2013 Toplines, supra note 128, at Q30–35. 
 138. Id. 
 139. We found more explicit confirmation of this point in the 2014 poll, in which only 
41.2% said it was “absolutely essential” that the criminal justice system “ensur[e] that people 
who commit crimes receive the punishment they deserve.” 2014 Toplines, supra note 130, at 
Q28a. Somewhat greater numbers said it was “absolutely essential” that the system “keep[] 
crime victims informed about their cases and help[] them to understand how the system 
works” (42.7%) and that the system “mak[e] Wisconsin a safer place to live” (46.8%). Id. at 
Q28b, 28d. Majorities said it was also at least “very important” that the system rehabilitate 
offenders and reduce imprisonment costs. Id., at Q28c, 28e. 
 140. See, e.g., supra, Part IV.A and text accompanying note 118. 
 141. Id.; see also Mike Hough & Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal 
Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 279, 292 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 
5th ed. 2012) (reporting survey research in Britain showing that twenty-seven percent of 
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about how a commission of experts should be staffed and 
overseen, but concerns about the trustworthiness of corrections 
officials suggest that some institutional independence from the 
corrections department might be advisable. Neither Wisconsin’s 
old Parole Commission nor the ERRC had such institutional 
independence,142 which may account for some of the distrust both 
programs encountered. 
Second, we found high levels of support for taking into account 
a diverse set of considerations in the release decision. Wisconsin 
voters do not seem to support reducing the release decision to any 
single criterion. All of the following considerations were ranked as 
“very important” or “somewhat important” by at least eighty 
percent of respondents: 
 
• Prisoner’s record of good behavior in prison.143 
• Whether prisoner has accepted responsibility for his 
crime.144 
• Whether victim opposes release.145 
• Whether prisoner has obtained a GED or completed 
educational programs in prison.146 
• Whether prisoner has completed treatment for any 
addiction or mental illness.147 
• Whether prisoner has marketable skills and good 
employment prospects after release.148 
 
Our findings partially replicate the Pew Center’s national results, 
which indicate that eighty-six percent of respondents accept reducing 
prison time based on the completion of programs, while eighty-three 
 
respondents rate the performance of judges as good or better, while twenty-five percent give 
that rating to prisons). Surprisingly, we found a slight advantage for corrections officials in the 
2012 poll: thirty-six percent said that judges treat criminals too leniently, while only twenty-
nine percent said as much of prison officials. 2012 Toplines, supra note 94, at Q27a–27b. 
 142. Supra Part I.A.1 (Parole Commission); Nicole Murphy, Dying to Be Free: An 
Analysis of Wisconsin’s Restructured Compassionate Release Statute, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1679, 
1703–04 (2012) (Earned Release Review Commission). 
 143. 2013 Toplines, supra note 128, at Q24. 
 144. Id. at Q25. 
 145. Id. at Q26. 
 146. Id. at Q27. 
 147. Id. at Q28. 
 148. Id. at Q29. 
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percent accept reductions based on good behavior.149 Our survey is 
unique, however, in asking about acceptance of responsibility, victim 
views, and employment prospects. 
The finding on acceptance of responsibility, which had the 
second-highest support of the six criteria covered in the survey, may 
be especially noteworthy. As one of us has argued elsewhere, 
acceptance of responsibility has moral significance as a form of 
atonement for an offense.150 Incorporating acceptance into the early 
release decision may help to reconcile early release with the moral-
symbolic view of punishment; once an offender has atoned, he may 
be welcomed back into the community without representing a threat 
to its moral cohesion. Victim views may also gain some support from 
a similar set of instincts. Indeed, even good behavior in prison and 
the successful completion of treatment and educational programs 
may have an atoning character.151 
Third, we expressly confirmed that Wisconsin voters do not wish 
to limit early release to those who are physically incapable of 
threatening others. Only 42.5% agreed, and 51.9% disagreed, that 
“[e]arly release should be restricted to prisoners who are elderly, 
terminally ill or severely physically disabled.”152 
Fourth, as noted in the previous Section, we found majority 
support for a release opportunity as early as halfway through a 
sentence.153 This would actually be considerably more generous than 
any of the early release mechanisms included in TIS III.154 
Finally, we found majority support for early release even without 
distinguishing between violent and nonviolent offenders. The 
national survey research suggests that such a distinction would 
increase support for early release. However, if it is not necessary to 
make such a distinction in order to have a credible program, there 
 
 149. PEW 2012,supra note 104, at 4. 
 150. Michael M. O’Hear, Solving the Good-Time Puzzle: Why Following the Rules Should 
Get You Out of Prison Early, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 195, 210–18 (2012). 
 151. Id. at 218–22. 
 152. 2013 Toplines, supra note 85, at Q37. 
 153. Id. at Q19. 
 154. The ERRC was authorized to adjust sentences at the seventy-five percent mark. 
Norris, supra note 62, at 1573. Other components of TIS III included “positive adjustment 
time,” which might give up to a one-third discount from the original sentence, and the risk 
reduction sentence, which offered the possibility of release at the seventy-five percent mark. Id. 
at 1574–75. Other aspects of TIS III are not readily measurable in this way. For instance, the 
“certain early release” program permitted release up to one year early. Id. at 1576. 
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may be good reasons to avoid the distinction. There are many 
ambiguities in implementing such a distinction. Questions would 
arise such as, should the distinction between violent and nonviolent 
be based solely on the offense of conviction, or may prior criminal 
history also come into play? Which offenses count as “violent”?155 
Does one conviction of a violent crime forever brand the offender 
“violent,” no matter how aberrational the crime or how far in the 
past it occurred? If left with unfettered discretion to make such 
distinctions, risk-averse officials are apt to undermine the 
effectiveness of an early-release program by expanding the “violent” 
category so broadly as to encompass many offenders who are actually 
relatively safe bets.156 
V. SWING-VOTER PREFERENCES 
In this Part, we focus on differences among subsamples of the 
survey, most notably a group we call the “swing vote,” or those 
respondents who reported either strongly agreeing or agreeing with 
early release and agreeing with the statement that “truth in 
sentencing should be the law in Wisconsin.”157 This group of 
respondents is the most intriguing in that they seemingly hold two 
competing notions of sentencing and criminal punishment. In our 
view, this group of respondents actually represents the duality of 
public attitudes toward criminal punishment more generally.158 In the 
abstract, TIS laws capture sentiments of certainty, equity and fairness 
that most individuals support. Assuming sentences are fair and 
reasonable, a sensible criminal justice system should hold offenders 
to serve their full prison terms for everyone’s benefit, including the 
offenders themselves, who will have the benefit of knowing exactly 
how much time they must serve. On the other hand, however, 
notions of second chances and rehabilitation still underlie common 
understandings of what a responsive criminal justice system should 
 
 155. In recent years, the federal courts have been tying themselves in interpretive knots 
trying to decide which offenses count as violent for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal 
Act. Michael M. O’Hear, Mandatory Minimums: Don’t Give Up on the Court, 2011 CARDOZO 
L. REV. DE NOVO 67, 79–86. 
 156. Klingele, supra note 7, at 450–51. 
 157. 2013 Toplines, supra note 85, atQ23. 
 158. See MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 17 (2004) (“The general public holds complicated views about 
punishment that are neither monolithically nor single-mindedly punitive.”).  
OHEAR WHEELOCK.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
296 
accomplish. A system with post-sentencing flexibility allows officials 
to take expenditure considerations into account while also instilling 
programmatic components that allow for “second chances.” 
In our sample, we found 220 respondents in the “swing voter” 
group (that is, categorized as “1” for both the early release variable and 
our baseline support for TIS measure, which asked respondents wither 
they agreed with the statement that TIS should continue to be law in 
Wisconsin). This subsample constitutes 30.9% of the total sample. 
We first compare the swing voter group to respondents who 
support TIS but oppose early release. We refer to this subsample as 
the “law and order” group (N = 238 or 37% of the total 
respondents), since people in this group answered questions in a way 
that reflects the position that law violators should be punished 
harshly, and the focus of the criminal justice system should be 
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation rather than rehabilitation. 
We then compare the swing voters to respondents who oppose TIS 
and support early release, or the “rehabilitators” (N = 148 or 
twenty-three percent).159 Individuals in this group embody the 
perspective that rehabilitation should be a primary goal for the 
criminal justice system, and providing offenders with employment 
and educational opportunities constitutes a vital part of these efforts. 
In terms of demographic differences, the results of means 
difference t-tests160 indicate that the law and order group differs from 
the swing voters in the following ways: the law and order group has 
significantly higher marriage rates, a higher percentage of whites, and 
higher levels of political conservatism. Significantly fewer members of 
the law and order subsample reside in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin’s 
largest urban center, than in other areas of the state, which likely 
indicates that they tend to live in rural and suburban areas. 
Moving beyond demographic differences, we also found many 
differences between the law-and-order group and the swing voters in 
 
 159. There is a fourth category of respondents who opposed both TIS and early release, 
but this group comprised too few individuals (N = 38 or 5.3%) to conduct 
comparative analysis. 
 160. Mean difference t-test is a statistical procedure to determine whether differences in 
means or averages between two groups are statistically significant. For this stage of analysis and 
in Table 4, the reference group is the swing voter group. We tested for whether means for the 
law and order group and the rehabilitator group differed from the swing voter group, not 
whether means for the law and order and rehabilitator groups differed from each other. 
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attitudes towards sentencing and early release.161 For instance, we 
found statistically significant differences between the two groups in 
general punitiveness.162 We also found statistically significant 
differences with regard to our legitimacy variable; the law-and-order 
group was more supportive of judges making release decisions than 
were the swing voters. In part, this reflects more positive views 
among the law-and-order group about judges’ ability to use scientific 
evidence and to treat defendants in a fair and equal manner. 
In response to the questions about which criteria are most 
important for release decisions, we found significant differences 
across the board on the importance of offenders’ post-sentencing 
conduct and rehabilitative progress.163 As expected, the swing voters 
tend to value these criteria more than the law-and-order voters. The 
single criterion on which both groups agreed was victim views, with 
both groups tending to favor this criterion significantly more often 
than the rehabilitators. The swing voters thus seem distinctive from 
the other two groups in their tendency to want to balance a concern 
for victims with a desire to encourage and recognize offenders’ good 
conduct. Relative to the swing voters, the rehabilitators discount 
victim interests, while the law-and-order voters discount early release 
for good conduct. 
The differences between the swing voters and the law-and-order 
voters are perhaps best captured in their responses to a question that 
asked respondents which of two statements came closest to their own 
point of view: 
Statement A: 
Prisons are a government spending program, and just like any 
other government program, they should be put to the cost-
benefit test. States should analyze their prison populations and 
figure out if there are offenders in expensive prison cells who 
can be safely and effectively supervised in the community at a 
lower cost. 
 
 161. Since we divided the larger sample of respondents by the central TIS measure and 
the early release variable, we are unable to observe how these groups differ along the measures 
specified as dependent variables throughout the regression models. 
 162. Our “punishment index” was comprised of answers to three questions about 
whether courts are too lenient, whether tougher sentences should be imposed on repeat 
offenders, and whether murderers should receive the death penalty. 
 163. These variables were then recoded so that “very important” = 3, “somewhat 
important” = 2, and “not important” = 1.  
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Or 
Statement B: 
People who commit crimes belong behind bars, end of 
story. It may cost a lot of money to run prisons, but it 
would cost society more in the long run if more criminals 
were on the street.164 
As expected, swing voters were more likely to support Statement 
A than law-and-order voters. Again, we see in the swing voters a 
relatively nuanced attitude toward penal policy that requires a 
balancing of competing considerations, while the law-and-order 
voters are relatively more likely to express a simplified, “lock ‘em up 
and throw away the key” viewpoint.165 
 
 
Table 4: Mean Difference T-Tests for 3 Subgroups166 
 Swing 
Voters 
Law and 
Order 
Rehabilitators 
 Mean  Mean  Mean  
Age  50.31 50.66 45.00*** 
Married .49 .70*** .54 
Race/Ethnicity .88 .95** .91 
Frequency of 
Church 
Attendance 
3.74 3.73 3.20** 
Milwaukee 
County Resident 
.18 .10** .24 
Political Views 3.13 3.53*** 2.45*** 
 
 164. See 2013 Toplines, supra note 85, at Q20. 
 165. We hypothesize that there may be a relationship between these differences and the 
residential differences between the two groups, with the swing voters more likely to live in or 
near Milwaukee, Wisconsin’s main urban center. Although we did not ask questions directly on 
this topic, it is at least plausible that the swing voters, with their more urban orientation, are 
more likely to be personally acquainted with someone who has either committed a serious 
crime or been victimized by a serious crime. If so, then questions of penal policy could have an 
experiential dimension for the swing voters. The law-and-order voters, by contrast, may tend 
to view penal policy in more abstract and symbolic terms, which may lead to more absolutist 
policy preferences. We found some support for this view in the 2014 poll, in which there was a 
positive, bivariate relationship (albeit not at quite the .05 level) between support for early 
release and whether someone in the respondent’s immediate family had ever been charged with 
a crime. For the topline results, see 2014 Toplines, supra note 129, at Q30, 31.  
 166. Due to space, we only included variables in table 4 with means for either the law-
and-order group or the rehabilitators that differed significantly from swing voters.  
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College 
Educated 
.43 .48 .54* 
Which 
perspective 
comes closest to 
your views 
1.32 1.67*** 1.18** 
Judges vs. 
Experts 
.32 .44** .22* 
Judges better 
with science  
.12 .21*** .023*** 
Judges better at 
fair and equal 
treatment 
.19 .29*** .19 
Judges better 
meeting 
community 
needs  
.28 .3 .11*** 
Neighborhood 
Care 
3.41 3.38 3.11*** 
Share Values 3.17 3.10 2.80*** 
Move to Another 
Community 
2.70 2.65 2.30** 
Punishment 
Index 
8.84 9.60*** 6.60*** 
Good Behavior  2.52 2.20*** 2.62 
Acceptance  2.67 2.50*** 2.70 
Victim 
Opposition 
1.30 1.30 .98*** 
GED 2.31 2.00*** 2.43* 
Mental Health 
Treatment  
2.70 2.50** 2.80 
Skills  2.38 2.16** 2.33 
Can’t trust 
gov’t to do 
right 
2.87 2.92 2.66* 
Gov’t wastes tax 
money 
3.5 3.63* 3.22** 
p = 0.05, p = 0.01, p = 0.001 
Turning to our third subsample, the rehabilitators tended on 
average to be significantly younger (over five years), have lower levels 
of church attendance, and have higher levels of education in 
comparison to the swing voters. While swing voters tended to be 
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significantly less politically conservative than the law-and-order 
group, rehabilitators were even significantly less politically 
conservative than swing voters. Similarly, while swing voters had 
significantly lower levels of support for judges making release 
decisions than the law-and-order group, the rehabilitators were even 
less likely to favor judges. 
Another interesting finding is that the rehabilitators differed 
substantially from swing voters on the community-cohesion 
measures that we used to test the symbolic explanation for TIS 
support. Significantly fewer rehabilitators reported living around 
neighbors that care about their community and living in a 
community where people shared values. Significantly more 
rehabilitators reported that moving to another community would 
not bother them. These findings suggest that the rehabilitators, 
while no more statistically likely than the swing voters to live in 
Milwaukee County, nonetheless tend to live in less cohesive 
neighborhoods.167 Lastly, rehabilitators were the least punitive 
subsample (significantly less punitive than swing voters, who were 
in turn less punitive than the law-and-order group) and the least 
likely to agree that “people who commit crimes belong behind 
bars, end of story.” 
In sum, disaggregating these data into three categories suggests 
that there are in fact three distinct positions on criminal justice and 
criminal punishment. The first group, or the law-and-order 
subsample, tends to be individuals who live either in rural sections of 
Wisconsin or the outer suburban regions. They are almost exclusively 
white, older, politically conservative, and possess high levels of 
punitiveness towards law violators. In our view, these voters support 
TIS largely because they understand these policies to be an extension 
of the tough-minded law and order position they favor. 
In sharp contrast, the rehabilitators tend to be younger, more 
racially diverse, better-educated, political liberals. Rehabilitators have 
more confidence that offenders can turn their lives around and favor 
encouraging and recognizing rehabilitation through early release 
opportunities, even at the expense of victims’ interests. In general, 
 
 167. We also analyzed whether those in the swing vote group were more or less likely to 
live in Milwaukee city limits instead of Milwaukee County. The results for Milwaukee and 
Milwaukee County were similar. The law and order group was less likely to live in the city of 
Milwaukee, and there was no significant difference between the swing vote and the 
rehabilitator group.  
OHEAR WHEELOCK.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:18 PM 
257 Imprisonment Inertia 
 301 
these voters oppose TIS because they perceive it as antithetical to 
their rehabilitation platform. 
The swing voters are the most intriguing. In some respects, they 
resemble the law-and-order group in that they tend to be older, have 
relatively high church attendance, and have relatively high levels of 
support for TIS laws. As a whole, however, they tend to be less 
punitive and more supportive of flexibility in punishment than their 
law-and-order counterparts.168 
How can early-release reformers appeal to the swing voters? 
Relative to other TIS supporters, this group seems to have many 
diverse objectives. Appeals to a single consideration (sending the 
right message, or doing the right thing for victims, or saving money, 
or making the punishment fit the crime) are not likely to be 
persuasive to this group. These voters seem interested in hearing 
about costs and benefits, about what victims want, and about making 
rehabilitation work. They are not especially fearful of crime. (There 
were no statistically significant differences among the three groups, 
in fact, with respect to our fear variable.) They do prefer for a 
commission of experts to make release decisions, and they seem 
particularly mindful of the commission’s potential advantages in the 
areas of using science and in ensuring fair and consistent treatment 
of offenders. At the same time, the swing voters seem more attuned 
than the rehabilitators to ensuring accountability for criminal 
offenses. In general punitiveness, the swing voters are much closer to 
the law-and-order group than they are to the rehabilitators. Since the 
instrumental fear-of-crime concern does not distinguish the groups, 
we suspect that the punitiveness of swing voters is related, at least in 
part, to moral-symbolic considerations. Reformers who favor early 
release should thus consider how their reforms can be reconciled 
with, or made to incorporate, the value of individual accountability 
for wrongdoing, such as through the acceptance of responsibility and 
the atonement concept noted above.169 
 
 168. Empirically, this further demonstrates that support for TIS laws is decoupled from 
more general notions of public desires to punish offenders. Rather, it seemingly taps support 
for a distinct attitude or belief concerning the criminal justice system. 
 169. Supra Part IV.C. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
We began this article by observing the phenomenon of 
“imprisonment inertia”—the persistence of America’s historically 
high imprisonment rate notwithstanding relatively low crime rates, 
fiscal pressures created by state corrections budgets, and the 
implementation of new programs in dozens of states intended to 
facilitate early release. Our finding of strong public support for 
“truth in sentencing”170 suggests one reason why policymakers have 
not adopted more robust early-release programs and why some 
programs, including those in Wisconsin, have even been eliminated 
entirely. Policymakers are understandably reluctant to embrace early-
release programs that may be seen as undermining the politically 
popular TIS ideal. 
Our research also suggests one reason why states have retained 
their TIS laws even as crime rates have steadily declined. While 
politicians may have played on public fears of crime in their efforts to 
build support for TIS,171 our research indicates that such fear does 
not play a central role in maintaining positive voter perceptions of 
TIS.172 Rather, TIS support seems motivated by other considerations. 
Our research particularly highlights the importance of legitimacy 
considerations, as well as general political conservatism.173 TIS 
support may also be based, in part, on its value as a symbolic 
reaffirmation of traditional morality in the face of perceived 
breakdowns in social responsibility, although our data do not permit 
firm conclusions in that regard. In any event, based on our analysis, 
we would certainly not expect support for TIS to move up or down 
with crime rates. 
Although public support for TIS presents a significant challenge 
for reformers who would like to see stronger imprisonment-
reduction policies, our research also indicates that TIS support is not 
absolute and inflexible. Indeed, we find majority support for release 
at the halfway mark in some cases, which would be a very significant 
deviation from the TIS ideal.174 
 
 170. Supra Part III. 
 171. Supra Part I.A.3. 
 172. Supra Part III. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Supra Part IV.B. 
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Our finding that support for TIS is not instrumental in nature 
complements Klingele’s argument that reformers who wish to 
develop politically viable early-release initiatives must show that such 
initiatives are not merely cost-saving (instrumentally beneficial) but 
also “fundamentally fair.”175 Our findings on the importance of 
legitimacy, moreover, suggest that attention to “fundamental 
fairness” should include attention to decision-making processes. 
For instance, our data indicate that voters prefer release decisions 
to be made by a “commission of experts.”176 Notably, we find that 
experts are seen as particularly good at making use of scientific 
knowledge and at ensuring fair and equal treatment of prisoners. 
Voters value these attributes, and a credible early release program 
should ensure that decisions take into account the best available 
science and avoid unwarranted disparities. 
More generally, we find strong support for basing release 
decisions on a wide range of variables, including several related to 
what the offender has done since being sentenced to prison.177 
Among other things, these public preferences represent an implicit 
rejection of the traditional retributive view that penal severity should 
be based exclusively on offense severity; “making the punishment fit 
the crime” seems not to be an exclusive or overriding objective of 
voters. At the same time, this should not necessarily be seen as a 
rejection or as belittling moral considerations in release decisions. 
Voters see release in some cases as “the right thing to do” even in 
the absence of public safety (instrumental) benefits.178 Moreover, 
voters overwhelmingly support “acceptance of responsibility” as a 
release criterion, which may also point to moral 
considerations (atonement).179 
Our data also indicate that release need not be restricted to 
elderly or physically incapacitated prisoners.180 Additionally, unlike 
other recent public-opinion research on early release,181 we did not 
limit our questions to the subject of “nonviolent” offenders. Our 
 
 175. Klingele, supra note 7, at 457. 
 176. Supra Part IV.C. 
 177. Id. 
 178. 2012 Toplines, supra note 94, at Q26d. 
 179. Supra Part IV.C. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Supra Part IV.A. 
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findings suggest that it may not be necessary to structure early 
release programs around the elusive violent/nonviolent distinction. 
Our findings point to the existence of three distinct groups of 
respondents based on their views of TIS and early release: the law-
and-order voters, the rehabilitators, and the swing 
voters.182Reformers should consider the duality of swing voters in 
order to build majoritarian public support for more robust early-
release mechanisms. In some respects, such as support for victims 
and general punitiveness, the swing voters look much more like the 
law-and-order voters than the rehabilitators. Yet, the swing voters are 
clearly distinguishable from the law-and-order voters in their greater 
interest in cost-benefit balancing, their stronger preference for expert 
decision-making, and their desire to encourage and recognize 
prisoners’ good conduct and rehabilitative progress. Advocates for 
reform would do well to bear in mind the diverse set of 
considerations that swing voters seem to take into account when 
evaluating penal policy options. 
Our findings illuminate the Wisconsin TIS story recounted in 
Part I. The pre-TIS parole system operated quite differently from the 
sort of early-release system that we find voters prefer. The old system 
was not seen as being based on principles of science or individual 
desert; rather, it was perceived to operate in an arbitrary and 
unpredictable way based largely on a desire to relieve prison 
overcrowding.183 The problem was not with early release per se, but 
with the particular early-release program in use at the time. 
It should not be a surprise, then, that the partial restoration of 
early release in TIS II184 has proven a durable and largely 
uncontroversial reform. Early release came back, but not through the 
old processes. The judicially administered system of TIS II may not 
have been what voters would have most preferred, but judges were 
nonetheless broadly accepted, particularly in light of the very limited 
extent to which early release was authorized in the new law. 
The bigger mystery is why TIS III failed. Our research indicates 
that the public would support a commission-administered early-
release program that is considerably more generous than what TIS II 
 
 182. Supra Part V. 
 183. John Welsh, Longer Sentences, Shorter Terms Average Prison Stay in Wisconsin Has 
Been Decreasing, State Journal Analysis Finds, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 15, 1998, at 1A; Supra 
Part I.A.1. 
 184. Supra Part I.B. 
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established. Why, then, did the Legislature overturn TIS III so 
quickly after it was adopted? Of course, legislative majorities do not 
always reflect the majoritarian preferences of a broader public, and 
we did not find such overwhelming public support for early release 
as to suggest a high political cost for disregarding it. Perhaps more 
important, though, was the failure to “sell” it to the public on any 
basis besides its projected cost-savings.185 Viewed this way, the new 
ERRC looked suspiciously like the old Parole Commission, which 
had also been focused on reducing the prison population as an end 
in itself.186 Although the ERRC might have been an expert 
commission, the public had no reason to think it would pay 
attention to the sorts of considerations that the public wants to 
control release decisions. In short, we do not think that the political 
failure of TIS III casts doubt on our conclusion that the public 
would support a properly framed and focused reincarnation of an 
Earned Release Review Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 185. Supra Part I.C. 
 186. Supra Part I.A.1. 
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